In a decision issued
July 21, 2015 the Missouri Supreme Court en banc addressed and resolved an
issue which has perplexed workers’ compensation practitioners for decades: What are the parties’ options to resolve a
future medical dispute after they have settled a claim, but agreed to leave
future medical “open”? The case is Stateex rel. ISP Minerals v. The Labor and
Industrial Relations Commission (“ISP v. LIRC”). However, in so finding,
the Supreme Court may have opened up a “Pandora’s Box” of consequences it did
not foresee when addressing this seemingly limited issue.
was a prohibition/mandamus action which arose out of the settlement of an
occupational disease claim. In the settlement, the parties left medical open
and designated a pulmonologist to monitor the employee’s lung disease. A dispute arose over the specialist’s prescription
for inhalers. Employee presented the
dispute to the LIRC. The LIRC concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the dispute,
and ordered a hearing. ISP filed a
petition in prohibition arguing the LIRC did not have jurisdiction. It relied on two prior decisions, Mosier v. St. Joe Lead Co. (Mo. App.
1992) and Shockley v. Laclede Elec. Co-Op (Mo. App. 1992), in so arguing. If
the LIRC was divested of jurisdiction at the moment of settlement approval,
claimant would have to reduce the settlement to a judgment in circuit court,
and file an action for specific performance of the settlement contract, or for
a declaration of the employer’s future medical responsibility under the settlement.
Mosier and Shockley held under Section. 287.390,
the LIRC lost jurisdiction upon approval of the settlement. However, the
Supreme Court distinguished these decisions, noting that in Mosier and Schockley the settlements
specifically stated all of the employer’s liability, including medical
liability, was being extinguished. Conversely,
in IPS v. LIRC, medical was left open.
The Supreme Court found nothing in the
language of Section 287.390 stated a settlement under that Section deprived the
LIRC of jurisdiction.In addition, the
Supreme Court drew a parallel between a settlement which leaves medical open on
one hand, and a partial award in which future medical remains unresolved, on
the other hand. In the case of a partial
award, the LIRC retained jurisdiction, so why should jurisdiction be lost in a
case which had been settled, but in which the parties had agreed to leave
Finally, the Court found
that the determination of an employee’s right to medical treatment under Section
287.140 was an issue which was considered to be “within the exclusive province
of the Division of Workers’ Compensation” (and therefore within the province of
the LIRC on appeal or after the Division has otherwise lost jurisdiction).To uphold ISP’s position would be to create
an exception to that principle.
Comment: It is true that before the Supreme Court’s decision
ISP v. LIRC, the parties were faced
with circuit court litigation to resolve fact issues which should properly be
within the purview of the Division or LIRC. However, few circuit court judges have the
necessary experience and expertise to act as Administrative Law Judges or LIRC
members. Moreover, even the most skillfully drafted open medical settlement
provisions cannot purport to predict and address every issue which might arise
in the future, to the extent necessary to permit a circuit court to resolve any
and all disputes based upon the contract’s language alone. To this extent then,
the Court’s determination the LIRC should resolve such issues makes good sense.
The problem, though, is that the ruling also raises questions for which there
are currently no answers; such as:
Questions or comment?
firstname.lastname@example.org (314-552-4020), email@example.com (314)-552-4027)
& Dixon, L.L.C., 2015